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"I'Tl tell you all my ideas about Looking-glass House.... You can see just
a little peep of the passage: and it's vemj like our passage as far as you can
see, only you know it may be quite different on beyond. Oh, Iittyl how
nice it would be if we could only get through into Looking-glass Housel
I'm sure it's got, ohl such beautiful things in it! Let's pretend there's a
way of getting through into it, somehow, Kitty. Let's pretend the glass
has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why, it's 'turnin9
into a sort of mist now, I declarel It'll be easy enough to get through-"
-ALcE THROUGH THE LooKING GLASS.
A COUNTERPART exists in the United States courts for most of
the remedies of the state courts including interpleader.1 Fed-
.eral interpleader resembles state interpleader, but is bound not
to be quite the same, for it is necessarily shaped by the peculiar
stresses caused by the requirement of diversity of citizenship.
The decisions are not numerous, but they present some very
-interesting problems. One group arose under the general equity
powers of the United States courts; aud a larger group under
the three successive Interpleader Acts which Congress has en-
acted, beginning in 1917, to assist life insurance companies and
similar organizations, which badly needed relief from conflicting
claims growing out of a single policy or other contract. Pending
bills contemplate the possibility of the extension of this protec-
Ition from injustice to other types of stakeholders. Interpleader
in the United States courts under such statutes bids fair to be
increasingly frequent and important, giving all persons con-
cerned in a controversy a more adequate chance to settle their
differences than is otherwise possible.
A stakeholder faced with two or more conflicting claims in-
volving the same property or obligation may have several reasons
-for wishing to interplead the various claimants in a United States
court. First, if there are two claimants living in different states,
neither of whom can be personally served in the state where the
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other resides, it is unlikely that the state courts in either state
will be able to give adequate relief to the stakeholder.- If the
nonresident claimant refuses to come in voluntarily for the sake
of a rapid settlement of the controversy, there is no way in which
a state court can acquire personal jurisdiction over him. Even
if jurisdiction in e'em, sufficient to bind the absent claimant, can
be acquired over land or tangible personalty within the state,'
the most frequent need for interpleader arises in controversies
as to the ownership of a debt or other obligation admittedly owed
by the stakeholder. In such a situation, the United States Su-
preme Court in New York Life Isurance Co. v. Dunl vy 4 de-
cided that a state court does not possess jurisdiction in rcmz over
the debt in an interpleader proceeding, and cannot adjudicate
its ownership in the absence of a nonresident claimant, so as
to prevent the latter from forcing the debtor to pay over again
by suing him in another state.2 The effect of the Dnde vy case
is strengthened by several recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court6 denying a state power to tax a chose in action
at the domicile of the obligor when the obligee resides in another
state. It is -true that the long series of foreign garnishment cases
has not yet been questioned, so that personal jurisdiction over
the debtor still gives power to discharge the debt; but it seems
probable that for all other purposes a state court will be held
unable to control the debt unless it has personal jurisdiction over
both the debtor and the creditor (including the nonresident
claimant, a potential creditor). If this interpretation of the
Dunlevy case be sound, then when the claimants to an obligation
reside in different states, neither state court can afford a satis-
factory remedy by interpleader. Obviously state legislation can-
2 For detailed discussion, see Chafee, Intcrstatc Intirpleadcr, sitpra
note 1.
3 As to tangible property, see id. at 698-700. Since equity is usually con-
sidered to act only in personam, a state statute applicable to interpleader
would probably be required to enable it to act in rcm as to such property
in this type of proceeding.
4241 U. S. 519, 36 Sup. Ct. 613 (1916). See Chafee, Intcrstate Inter-
pleader, supra note 1, at 711, where more limited interpretations of this
case by Judge Learned Hand and others are discussed.
5 As to the possibility of preventing him from recovering from the debtor
or the successful claimant in a suit in the same state as the interpleader, ee
Chafee, Interstate I2iterpleader, supra, note 1, at 715. The likelihood that
the due process clause will be held to invalidate the interpleader even
within the state is strengthened by the tax cases cited infra note 6.
6 Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930);
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54
(1930); First National Bank v. Maine, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932). These deci-
sions overruled Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903),
the relation of which to interpleader against a non-resident is discussed in
Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 1, at 705.
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not remedy the difficulty, for a state legislature cannot extend
the personal jurisdiction of its own courts over a potential
creditor beyond the limits of the state. On the other hand, Con-
gress may, if it wishes, give a United States district court nation-
wide personal jurisdiction so as to reach all the conflicting claim-
ants to an obligation. The Dunlevy decision led the life insurance
companies to obtain the first federal interpleader statute in the
following year, 1917, in order to bring claimants who were citi-
zens of different states into the United States courts.
Second, an interpleader suit will not give complete relief to the
stakeholder unless the entire controversy can be settled in the
interpleader proceeding. Consequently, when interpleader is
granted, the decrees discharging the stakeholder and ordering the
claimants to interplead with respect to the deposit in court also
enjoins the claimants from bringing or pressing any suits against
the stakeholder. Without these injunctions the relief would lose a
large part of its value. Now, a claimant who is a citizen of a
different state from the stakeholder often starts a suit against
him in the federal court before he has time to interplead. If the
stakeholder then seeks interpleader in a state court, he immedi-
ately faces the difficulty of the unwillingness of a state court to
enjoin federal suits. Of course, it will be objected that in a federal
court he will encounter a corresponding unwillingness to enjoin
state suits, because of section 265 of the Judicial Code. However,
this prohibition imposed by Congress can be taken away by Con-
gress at one fell swoop so far as it applies to interpleader, while
it is improbable that many state legislatures will become suffi-
ciently interested to remove the limitations on state injunctions
against pending federal suits. Furthermnore, the greater impor-
tance of the national sovereignty naturally makes federal courts
more ready to enjoin suits in another jurisdiction.
Third, whatever advantages of freedom from local prejudice
can be obtained in the United States courts in suits based on di-
versity of citizenship will also attach to federal interpleader. It
is true that recent writers T have expressed serious doubts
whether these advantages are sufficiently great to outweigh the
inconvenience of two parallel systems of courts for private litiga-
tion, but so long as the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction re-
mains it is only fair that stakeholders should be able to make use
of it as well as other litigants who are in a less embarrassing
situation. A nonresident who is subjected to two suits on the
same obligation in two different state courts needs protection
from local prejudice twice as badly as the ordinary defendant
who removes one state suit into the United States courts.
7 Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 IIARV.
L. RBu. 483; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United
States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
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Fourth, in the courts of many states, interpleader is hedged
about by unfortunate technical requisites8 It seems likely that
federal interpleader will be less burdened by these technicalities
and hence more calculated to attain justice. Since normally it is
on the equity side of a federal court," it is not subject to the pro-
cedural rules of the particular state, but governed by nationwide
principles of equitable relief. Although federal interpleader de-
cisions show some natural tendency to cite local state cases, they
also rely extensively upon federal interpleader cases, whether or
not they are in the same circuit. Consequently one or Pwo liberal
interpleader decisions in the United States courts may have a
marked influence in removing technicalities from interpleader
throughout the entire federal system. Still further improvements
of the remedy may be attained through the Federal Equity Rules
established by the Supreme Court, and if necessary by act of
Congress. Thus there may be situations where a stakeholder
would be able to attain in a United States court the much-needed
relief from double vexation which would be denied him in any
available state court because of its adherence to local precedents
hampering the adequate development of interpleader.
I
THE BASES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERPLEADER
A. Jurisdiction Apart from. the Federal Interpleader Legislation
Interpleader, like any other form of litigation, may not be brought
into the United States courts unless the applicant for relief can
establish the existence of some constitutional ground for the juris-
diction of these courts. So far as diversity of citizenship is con-
cerned, it is clear that some of the difficulties which prevent state
interpleader will often make federal interpleader also impos-
sible.'- Unlike ordinary litigation, an interpleader suit has three
parties. This means that the stakeholder must obtain personal
service upon both claimants. If they can only be served in sepa-
rate states, the United States courts in either state will be as help-
less as the state courts, unless Congress has aided the stakeholder
by extending the power of the United States court beyond the lim-
its of the state where it sits. Until the Interpleader Act of 1917 a
United States court could not acquire personal jurisdiction in an
interpleader suit by service outside the state wherein its district
8 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 1.
9 The possibility of interpleader on the law side will be discussed in a
subsequent issue of the Journal.
10 Detailed consideration of these difficulties, with citations, will be found
in Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 1, at 720.
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lay, and this legislation applies only to certain types of stakehold-
ers. A related difficulty concerns the production of evidence. A
United States court cannot compel the appearance of a witness liv-
ing more than one hundred miles from the court. Such a restric-
tion might very well operate to the injury of the distant claimant
who, though obliged to appear himself, could not force his wit-
nesses to come with him. It may be doubted whether depositions
taken where the distant witness resides would be an adequate sub-
stitute for his testimony in open court. Because of these geo-
graphical limitations, federal interpleader suits are very much
fewer than state interpleader suits. In the ordinary state inter-
pleader, all the parties live within the state. Such a case could
not, of course, get into the United States courts unless some fed-
eral right was involved. On the other hand, the very diversity of
citizenship which confers federal jurisdiction may at the same
time make it impossible to obtain the proper personal service
upon the claimants. In spite of these obstacles, enough inter-
pleader litigation has arisen in the United States courts to repay
examination.
In this connection it is desirable to remind the reader that bills
of interpleader fall into two types: (1) Strict bills of inter-
pleader offer no ground for equitable relief except multiple vexa-
tion. All the issues involved in the controversy are purely legal
issues, which would be tried by a jury if interpleader were not
granted. Consequently the applicant cannot get equitable relief
and dispense with jury trials without compliance with the requi-
sites of interpleader whatever these may happen to be in the
particular jurisdiction. (2) Bills in the nature of interpleader
lie when the applicant shows that in addition to multiple vexa-
tion he has some other reason for coming into equity, for instance,
the administration of a trust, the enforcement of a lien, or can-
cellation of an instrument. Courts are much more liberal toward
bills in the nature of interpleader and dispense with some of the
requisites of strict bills. Although the distinction between these
two types of bills will become important when we examine the
equitable principles applied in the United States courts, the prob-
lems of federal jurisdiction are the same for both types. The
presence of a federal right or of diversity of citizenship must be
shown as clearly for a bill in the nature of interpleader as for a
strict bill. Consequently, decisions establishing federal jurisdiC-
tion over bills in the nature of interpleader are precedents for
federal jurisdiction over strict bills, and vice versa.
The federal interpleader cases before the interpleader statutes
or subsequent to them but outside the scope of that legislation,
may be placed in three groups: (1) original bills in cases arising
under the Constitution and the laws of the United States; (2)
original bills based on diversity of citizenship; (3) ancillary bills,
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connected with suits at law or in equity already in a United States
court because of either a federal question or diversity.1
Original Bills of Interpleader Involving a Federal Question,
Since the United States courts - have jurisdiction of such cases,
regardless of the citizenship of the parties, the co-citizenship of
two or more of the persons involved in the interpleader causes
no difficulties.
Foss v. First National Bank of Deaver23 adjudicated the own-
ership of a joint deposit in a national bank. Some claimants had
sued both the bank and the other claimants in equity in the
United States Circuit Court. The bank answered, disclaiming
interest and alleging doubt as to the ownership of the deposit,
and also filed a cross-bill asking interpleader. All the parties
were citizens of the same state. Since Congress had given the
United States courts jurisdiction over suits by and against na-
tional banks, 4 it was held that the court had jurisdiction over the
cross-bill as in effect an original bill of interpleader by the bank.
Doubt was expressed as to the jurisdiction over the bill against
the bank and over its answer, because that suit was not really
against the national bank as an active party. In Pacific Bank v.
Mixter " there is a dictum by Waite, C. J., that the sureties on
an attachment bond given by a national bank might have inter-
pleader.
In Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon, National Ba2zk,"' a national bank
in Kansas held a joint deposit to be paid either to a Virginia
corporation or to an Oklahoma corporation and several citizens
of Kansas, accordingly as a contract for the sale of oil land was
or was not performed. The Virginia corporation brought an ac-
tion of money had and received at law in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Kansas, to recover the deposit. The bank inter-
II The attitude of the federal courts toward interpleader may be affected
by two other groups of cases which do not involve the jurisdiction of United
States courts. (1) Interpleader cases originating in the District of Colum-
bia and the territories: Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568, 4 Sup. Ct.
232 (1884); Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); Royal
Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 44 App. D. C. 570 (1916) ; Morgan v. Kraft, 52 App.
D. C. 172, 285 Fed. 906 (1922). (2) Comments by a United States judge
about the effect of a state interpleader proceeding: Smith v. Mosier, 169
Fed. 430 (D. N. Y., 1909).
1 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1926) deals with most types of statutory jurisdiction
of the district courts. See especially § 41(1) (a).
13 3 Fed. 185 (C. C. D. Colo. 1880), af'd without discussion of the inter-
pleader point in Bissell v. Foss, 114 U. S. 252, 5 Sup. Ct. 851 (1885).
14 28 U. S. C. § 41 (16) (1926).
15124 U. S. 721, 8 Sup. Ct. 718 (1888).
1 260 U. S. 235, 43 Sup. Ct. 118 (1922), rcv'g 271 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 8th,
1921). This case like some of the others involving federal questions might
perhaps be classified under the ancillary jurisdiction.
19321 11619
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pleaded the other participants in the deposit under section 274b
of the Judicial Code, allowing equitable defenses in law suits-
to be discussed in detail later in this article." The opinions in
the Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court dealt mainly
with the question whether the controversy between the claimants
in the second stage of the interpleader should be considered as a
legal' or an equitable proceeding. Neither the briefs nor the
opinions qustioned the propriety of interpleader or the jurisdic-
tion of the United States courts over such relief.
The United States may sue in a federal court.18 The govern-
ment's position with respect to conflicting claims to war risk
insurance closely resembles that of life insurance companies,
which have found interpleader a necessary method of obtaining
relief from double vexation. In two such cases the government
was allowed interpleader.19 When a statute required the Secre-
tary of the Navy to sell a government vessel to the highest bidder,
the United States ascertained by interpleader which of two bid-
ders should be considered the higher.
20
Two cases involved interpleader against the Alien Property
Custodian. Judge Mayer allowed a bank to interplead a depositor,
an American citizen, and the Alien Property Custodian who
claimed the deposit on the ground that the actual owner was an
enemy alien.21 However, Judge Learned Hand refused inter-
pleader to a citizen who sought to determine whether the prop-
erty of which he was trustee was held for the benefit of another
citizen or for that of enemy aliens, as the Alien Property Cus-
todian claimed.
2 2
When a surety bond is given to the United States which sues
upon it for the benefit of private persons whose aggregate claims
exceed the amount of liability on the bond, it seems that in an
appropriate situation the surety company might have inter-
pleader in the United States court against the conflicting claim-
ants. However, a surety company which had bonded a Post Office
clerk who stole from the mails, was denied interpleader against
various claimants to the money paid in reimbursement because
the statute provided an administrative method of adjusting their
claims before a postal official.28
17 Under section III B which will be published in a subsequent issue.
1828 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1926).
19 State Bank & Trust Co. v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926);
Heinemann v. Heinemann, 50 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
20o Levinson v. U. S., 258 U. S. 198, 42 Sup. Ct. 275 (1922), rev'g 267
Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
21Am. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Palmer, 256 Fed. 680 (D. N. Y. 1919).
For the Trading with the Enemy Act, see 50 U. S. C. Appendix.
22 Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909 (D. N. Y. 1920).
23 U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 247 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 6th,




Original Bills of Interpleader Based on Diversity of Citizenship
If the stakeholder and all of the claimants are citizens respec-
tively of different states, complete diversity of citizenship exists
and jurisdiction over an interpleader action can be obtained in
any United States court so long as the requirements of venue are
satisfied and the process of that court can be personally served
on all the claimants. Obviously such personal service is impossible
if each claimant can be served only in the state of which he is
a citizen. It sometimes happens, however, that a claimant who is
not a citizen of the state in which the United States court sits,
is nevertheless personally present in that state so that he can be
served. If the claimantjs a corporation, incorporated in another
state, it may be doing business in the state of suit and have
agents there. The opinions do not give us much information
about the means by which the United States court sitting in one
state obtained personal service upon those claimants who were
citizens of other stat~s, but such jurisdiction has been acquired
in several instances. Perhaps in some of the cases the non-citizen
claimant appeared voluntarily.
In German Savings Institution v. Adae 2- a Missouri bank
interpleaded a citizen of Illinois and a citizen of Ohio in the
Missouri Circuit Court. In Hayward v. McDonald - z a Louisianan
interpleaded a citizen of Georgia and a citizen of Texas in the
Louisiana District Court. Interpleader was denied as unneces-
sary in Pusey & Janes Co. v. Milleri2 where it was sought by a
Delaware corporation against a Pennsylvanian and an Alabaman
in the Delaware Circuit Court; but no doubt was expressed as
to the existence of federal jurisdiction.
Is complete diversity of citizenship essential to federal juris-
diction over interpleader in situations not covered by any federal
interpleader legislation? First, suppose one of the claimants is
a citizen of the same state as the stakeholder. Under the statutes
regulating the jurisdiction of United States courts, it has been
repeatedly held that the requisite diversity of citizenship does not
exist when citizens of the same state are on different sides of the
controversy.27 Does the suggested interpleader suit violate this
rule? If we regard the second stage of the interpleader as the
real controversy and the first stage as merely incidental, it is
sufficient if the claimants are citizens of. different states, and the
citizenship of the stakeholder is immaterial. On the other hand,
it is hard to regard the first stage as negligible when we remem-
ber that most of the knock down and drag out fights in inter-
24 8 Fed. 106 (C. C.. D. Mo. 1880).
25192 Fed. 890 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912). See also City Bank v. Skelton, infra
note 56, possibly though not probably a case of ancillary jurisdiction.
26 61 Fed. 401 (C. C. D. Del. 1894).
- The leading case is Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 180G).
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pleader suits occur in the first stage. If the objecting claimant
is a citizen of the same state as the applicant, the first stage is
then clearly not a controversy between citizens of different states.
In several cases where it was sought to remove an interpleader
suit from a state court to a United States court which would have
had personal jurisdiction over all the parties, the removal was re-
fused because the stakeholder was a co-citizen of one claimant, the
requisite diversity of citizenship being said not to exist.21 On the
other hand, interpleader has been granted in at least three fed-
eral cases where the stakeholder was a co-citizen of one or more
of the claimants.&2 Unfortunately, in none of these cases does the
opinion discuss the question whether the co-citizenship ousts the
jurisdiction of the United States court, and it is possible that no
objection was made on this point.
A different kind of difficulty arises when two or more claimants
are citizens of the same state. The Massachusetts state court re-
fused to permit removal of an interpleader suit to the United
States court where the claimants were.both citizens of Massa-
chusetts and the stakeholder was a New York corporation."
This objection, however, does not appear to have been raised in
any of the reported cases in the United States courts. In four
of these cases 31 the question was not discussed. In Knideerbooker
Trust Company v. Kalamazoo,,3 a New York trust company which
was trustee under the mortgage bonds of a Michigan street rail-
way corporation filed a bill in equity in a United States Circuit
Court in Michigan against the street railway corporation, some
of its officials, and a Michigan city which was taking steps to
forfeit summarily the franchise of the street railway company
without any judicial proceedings. Here all the defendants were
citizens of Michigan, yet relief in the nature of interpleader was
granted. The city in opposing relief apparently placed no insist-
ence upon its co-citizenship with the other defendants, and its
2aLeonard v. Jamison, 2 Edw. Ch. 136, 137 (N. Y. 1833): "There is
something to be settled between him and the defendants before the latter can
litigate together." Republic Fire Insurance Co. v. Keogh, 23 Hun 664 (N. Y.
1881) ; see George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. 299 (Va. 1877).
20 Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 8 Wheat. 268 (U. S. 1823);
McWhirter v. Halsted, 24 Fed. 828 (C. C. D. N. J. 1885); Thomas Kay
Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague, 259 Fed. 338 (D. Ore. 1919). A federal suit
was pending against the stakeholder in the first two cases, so that the inter-
pleader was perhaps ancillary, but this is improbable. The first case is too
early, the second treats the bill as original. In the third case, a suit was
pending but it is not stated that it was in the federal court.
30 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Allen, 134 Mass. 389 (1883).
31 Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Co.; McWhirter v. Halsted, both
supra note 29, probably not ancillary to pending federal suits; Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. F. & M. Nat. Bank, 173 Fed. 390 (C. C. D. Ohio 1909);
National Sash and Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 F. (2d) 342
(C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
32182 Fed. 865 (C. C. D. Mich. 1910).
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only jurisdictional objection was that the trust company and the
street railway corporation were not really antagonistic to each
other, so that on a realignment of parties the street railway cor-
poration ought to be joined as a co-plaintiff. The court, however,
held that the interests of these two parties were sufficiently ad-
verse. Interpleader was denied by the United States Supreme
Court in a case 33 where the stakeholder was a citizen of Missis-
sippi and all four claimants were of Alabama, but the only reason
given for refusing relief was that the Mississippi District Court
had not obtained personal jurisdiction over some of the claimants
by service of process.
In the remaining cases where interpleader was brought into
the United States courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship,
the reports do not give sufficient information about the citizen-
ship of the various parties to enable us to determine whether any
of them were co-citizens2 Thus the question whether complete
diversity of citizenship is necessary for original bills of inter-
pleader has not yet been satisfactorily adjudicated.
Another unsettled question relates to the jurisdictional amount
in interpleader suits. The statutory requirement for diversity of
citizenship suits in general is, that the sum in controversy shall
exceed $3000.35 Is this requirement satisfied when the aggregate
33 Herndon v. Ridgway, 17 How. 424 (U. S. 1854). The bill was possibly
but not probably ancillary to a pending federal suit. Nothing is said to
that effect and the case is early. If all the claimants except one are per-
sonally served, it might be worth while to let those served interplead, so as
to determine their rights at least and protect the stakeholder from their
claims; but the absent claimant was held an indispensable party in Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, infra notes 106, 107.
34 Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., 83 Fed. 891 (C. C.
D. Cal. 1897) ; McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, 114
Fed. 910 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902), affg Provident Say. Life Assur. Soc. v. Loeb,
115 Fed. 357 (C. C. D. La. 1901); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lane, 151
Fed. 276 (C. C. D. Ga. 1907), af'd by memo sztb. izom. Alexander v. Lane,
157 Fed. 1002 (C. C. A. 5th, 1907), cert. den- 208 U. S. 617, 28 Sup. Ct.
568 (1908); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Belek, 211 Fed. 699 (C. C. D. Neb.
1913); Holt v. Russell, 30 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929), cert. den. 279
U. S. 856, 49 Sup. Ct. 351; Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Sailor, 47 F.
(2d) 911 (D. Cal. 1930), possibly under the federal Interpleader Act al-
though this is not mentioned. See also the following possibly ancillary cases
where citizenship is uncertain: Union Insurance Co. v. Glover, infra note
60; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Clark, infra note 61; Wells, Fargo and
Co. v. Miner, infra note 62; Federal Cement Co. v. Shaffer, infra note 56.
The following unreported interpleader cases are known to exist in United
States District Courts: N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Coldren (Dec. 1924,
N. D. Ill.); N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Donnelley (Jan. 1925, W. D. Mo.);
National Life Insurance Co. v. Planters Bank (Nov. 1927, N. D. Tenn.);
National Life Insurance Co. v. Theological Seminary (Apr. 1928, N. D.
fI1). These have not been examined; some may be ancillary, some may be
under federal interpleader legislation.




of the conflicting claims exceeds that amount, but each separate
claim is less? Suppose each of two claimants asserts ownership
of a $2000 bank deposit. If interpleader be denied the bank may
be subjected to a double recovery and so lose $4000. If it be
granted to prevent that loss, the bank will deposit only $2000 in
court to be fought over in the second stage by the claimants. Is
"the sum in controversy" $4000 or $2000? Probably $2000. A
reasonable test of jurisdictional amount, at least in strict bills of
interpleader, is the maximum sum which the stakeholder will have
to deposit in court to get a discharge from liability 0 The "con-
troversy," lor purposes of the jurisdictional amount, is the second
stage of the interpleader and not the first stage.
Some help on this question can be obtained from Mr. Justice
Pitney's observations on a different situation: 87
"The settled rule is that when two or more plaintiffs having sepa-
rate and distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential
that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount;
but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right
in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough
if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount."
The claimants may be regarded as "plaintiffs" within this state-
ment. The stakeholder is only a nominal plaintiff, for interpleader
is by nature a defensive proceeding. Although the claimants are
defendants in form in this suit, they are plaintiffs in the pending
or threatened suits at law against the stakeholder which it is his
main purpose to avoid by the interpleader. And in a way the
claimants are plaintiffs against the sum deposited in court, hav-
36 The only interpleader case in point may be contra, because it rejected
the amount of the deposit as a test, but the circumstances were peculiar.
Hayward v. McDonald, supra note 25. At a time when the jurisdictional
amount was $2000, the stakeholder, an agent, was sued (in what courts It
is not stated) by two claimants for $5700 and $2500, respectively. He filed
a bill (apparently not ancillary) offering to pay into court $1175, which he
admitted as the extent of his liability. In reversing a decree dismissing the
bill, the Circuit Court of Appeals regarded the bill as in tho nature of
interpleader because of the necessity for an accounting and the fiduciary
position of the stakeholder. The jurisdictional amount was said to exist
since each claimant was suing for more than the requisite sum though less
was deposited. This decision is not necessarily inconsistent with the deposit
test suggested in the text, for here the deposit did not, as usual in strict
bills, correspond to the highest claim. Since this was not a strict bill, the
stakeholder was not discharged after making the deposit of $1175, but re-
mained subject to the control of the court which might oblige him to pay in
more when the extent of his disputed liability should be determined. This
liability might well prove to equal the smaller claim, at least. For a bill
in the nature of interpleader the test should be, not the actual deposit made
with the bill, but the maximum sum capable of being ordered paid in during
the whole course of the suit.
v Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U. S. 594, 596, 36 Sup. Ct. 416, 417 (1916).
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ing "separate and distinct demands." It would usually be neces-
sary, therefore, for each claimant to demand more than $3000,38
and the deposit must consequently exceed that sum to confer
federal jurisdiction. This interpretation of the general diversity
of citizenship statute receives some support from the express lan-
guage of Congress in the federal interpleader statutes, which, as
we shall see, test the jurisdictional amount by the size of the
obligation or property claimed and deposited2
Ancillary Bills of Interpleader
When a suit at law or in equity has already been brought against
the stakeholder in the United States court, which has jurisdiction
thereof either because of diversity of citizenship or because of a
federal question, there is considerable authority allowing the
stakeholder to file a bill of interpleader, or in the nature of inter-
pleader, against the plaintiff (in the previous federal suit) and
one or more additional claimants. If such an interpleader pro-
ceeding can be considered as ancillary to the suit against the
stakeholder, it is immaterial that he is a co-citizen of any of the
added claimants or that co-citizenship exists among the claimants.
The doctrine that ancillary suits are possible in the United
States courts without regard to diversity of citizenship has long
been established in situations other than interpleader. Professor
Dobie thus explains: -o
"We now come to a different class of jurisdiction, variously called
ancillary, auxiliary, dependent, incidental, or supplementary.
This jurisdiction is not absolute, but relative; it exists not for
itself, but by virtue of its relation to a case of which the court
has already acquired jurisdiction. The whole reason for its exist-
38 If one claimant sought $3500 and the other only $2999 as the amount
of the debt, the stakeholder ought to be able to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement by depositing the larger sum, as he must usually do to get a
strict bill. Chafee, Modernizing Interpicadcr, supra note 1, at 824.
39 An alternative test of jurisdictional amount might be the sum by
which the aggregate of all the claims exceeds the stakeholder's admitted
liability, for it is this excess which he seeks to avoid by interpleading. So
far as he is concerned, nothing else is in controversy. Suppose four sub-
contractors or partial assignees, each claiming $1000, and two more each
claiming $500; the aggregate is $5000, but everybody agrees that the stake-
holder's liability is limited to $3500. He wishes to deposit this sum and
determine priorities. The claimants object that his only controversy with
them is as to the excess of $1500, since he raises no dispute as to 3500.
However, the claimants dispute about $3500, and that is enough. Observe
that Pitney's reasoning should not apply here, because the claimants do not
make "distinct and separate demands" but overlap. Each claims only part
of the conceded liability of the stakeholder, not all of it as usual. It would
be absurd to test the jurisdiction by the amount of the lowest single claim,
$500, or the highest, $1000.
40o DOBME, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROcEnUR (1928) 323.
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ence is that without it the court could neither effectively dispose
of the principal case nor do complete justice in the premises.
Principal jurisdiction involves and carries along with itself power
over matters that can properly be regarded as accessorial.
"Since ancillary jurisdiction exists by virtue of the relation of
the incidental proceeding to the principal case over which juris-
diction already exists, this relation alone creates and establishes
jurisdiction over such incidental proceeding. As to such ancillary
proceeding, accordingly, the amount of money concerned, the citi-
zenship of the parties therein, and the federal or non-federal
nature of the questions involved are quite immaterial."
The ancillary jurisdictioni exists whether the principal suit is at
law or in equity. Probably it is more frequently invoked in suits
in equity, where the introduction of new parties by the supple-
mental bill resembles intervention.41 It is important to observe,
however, that the question whether a bill is original or ancillary
is not determined by the tests ordinarily applied in equity plead-
ing. A bill which might be considered original under such tests
may be regarded as ancillary for purposes of federal jurisdiction.
This has been carefully pointed out by Mr. Justice Miller: 4
"The question is not whether the proceeding is supplemental and
ancillary or is independent and original, in the sense of the rules
of equity pleading; but whether it is supplemental and ancillary
or is to be considered entirely new and original, in the sense which
this court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides
the jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the State
courts. No one, for instance, would hesitate to say that, according
to the English chancery practice, a bill to enjoin a judgment at
law, is an original bill in the chancery sense of the word. Yet
this court has decided many times, that when a bill is filed in the
Circuit Court, to enjoin a judgment of that court, it is not to be
considered as an original ill, but as a continuation of the pro-
ceeding at law; so much so, that the court will proceed in the
injunction suit without actual service of subpoena on the defend-
ant, and though he be a citizen of another State, if he were a
party to the judgment at law."
The ancillary jurisdiction is roughly divided by Professor Dobie
into two classes: 43
"(1) Proceedings which are concerned with the pleadings, proc-
esses, records, or judgments of the court in the principal case;
(2) proceedings which affect property already in the custody
or control of the court."
- See Hersman, Intervention in Federal Courts (1927) 61 AImx L. Rv. 1,
161.
42 Minnesota v. St. Paul Rr., 2 Wall. 609, 633 (U. S. 1864).
43 Supra note" 40, at 323-4.
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Ancillary bills of interpleader are found in both these classes.
It is probably easier to get ancillary interpleader under the
second heading, where relief is sought against double vexation
with respect to a res already in court. Equity courts are well
accustomed to adjudicate the distribution of such a res among
several claimants, and to prevent them from asserting their claims
by parallel conflicting suits elsewhere.4 A leading case permit-
ting a bill in the nature of interpleader in such a situation is
Groves v. SenteUl.45 Two sisters mortgaged their undivided land
to secure their joint note for $8000. Later they partitioned the
land and one sister.gave a second mortgage on her share alone.
After a foreclosure sale of her land under this second mortgage,
the purchaser, A, held back from the purchase price sufficient
cash to pay the balance of $5750 still due on the first mortgage.
The first mortgagees brought an action at law for this whole sum
against A in the United States Circuit Court of Louisiana, based
on diversity of citizenship. The second mortgagor was contending
that since she had made all the payments in reduction of the first
mortgage, they should be applied against her half of the original
first mortgage debt. Consequently she claimed a considerable
portion of the fund in A's hands, and sought to marshal most
of the unpaid balance of the first mortgage against her sister's
land, which was not covered by the second mortgage. Under these
circumstances A (of Louisiana) filed a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader, joining the first mortgagees (of Indiana and Ohio), the
second mortgagor sister (of Virginia), and the liquidator of the
second mortgagee (of Louisiana). The other sister (of Louisi-
ana) was made a party defendant by order of the court. Al-
though the opinion of Mr. Justice White aoes not discuss the
basis of federal jurisdiction or the fact that the stakeholder and
two claimants were citizens of Louisiana, the bill was maintained
without any question, and the whole fund was awarded to the
first mortgagee with no marshalling. This was a bill in the nature
of interpleader and not a strict bill, 4 because A had an interest
in the fund as a partner in the firm which took the second mort-
gage; consequently A did not get counsel fees out of the fund.4 T
Interpleader suits also seem proper under the first heading of
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269 (1890) ; Sercomb
v. Catlin, 128 Ill. 556 (1889) ; Chafee v. Quidnick Co., 13 R. I. 442 (1881);
DOBIE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 328.
45 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898 (1894). The facts as to citizenship are
taken from the record.
46 Groves v. Sentell, 66 Fed. 179 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895); Sherman National
Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
47 Other federal interpleader cases which apparently involved a fund are
the following: Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Co.; Aetna National
Bank v. U. S. Life Insurance Co.; Lockett v. Rumbough; Mundy v. Louis-
ville & N. Rr.; Buck v. Mason, all infra note 56.
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the federal ancillary jurisdiction, although some doubts on this
point will have to be considered. Professor Dobie states the
reasons for this kind of ancillary relief in general, as follows: 41
"Every real court has, and must have, a broad jurisdiction over
its pleadings, processes, record, and judgment. Without this in-
herent power, it could not function effectively as a court. And
under this head falls a large part of the ancillary jurisdiction of
the federal District Court, extending to many and varied pro-
ceedings in connection with the annulment, interpretation, modi-
fication, and enforcement of its pleadings, processes, records, and
judgments. This power, though quite broad, is subject to bounds
set by principles of necessity and efficiency, as it is hedged about
by limitations imposed by historical policies and precedents. The
jurisdiction begins with the institution of the suit; it continues
until its final disposition, until the rights of the litigants not only
have been adjudged or decreed, but also until the judgment hag
been finally satisfied or the decree completely carried out."
For example, ancillary bills, bringing in co-citizens who were not
parties to the principal suit, were maintained to construe a
decree already given,4 and to enforce a federal judgment against
prdperty conveyed by the debtor in fraud of creditors to grantees
who were co-citizens of the plaintiff.10 The Supreme Court has
sanctioned an ancillary suit by members of a fraternal benefit
association, citizens of the state in which it was incorporated,
for the purpose of intervening in a representative suit brought
against the association by members residing in other states., '
The total absence in this last case of any res, either in court or
in the federal district or indeed anywhere, is to be noticed. An
interpleader suit is a much milder exercise of the ancillary juris-
diction. To permit one claimant who may really not own the
debt to get a federal judgment against a stakeholder, without
giving the latter an adequate opportunity to interplead and pro-
tect himself against later suits by the other claimant, would be
doing injustice, not justice. As Mr. Justice Miller says in an
analogous situation: 52
"An unjust advantage has been obtained by one party over an-
other by a perversion and abuse of the orders of the court, and
the party injured comes now to the same court to have this
abuse corrected."
There are many situations appropriate for interpleader where
48Supra note 40, at 324.
49 Minnesota v. Milvaukee & St. Paul Rr., supra note 42, at 632.
so Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 164 Fed. 91 (C. C. D. Mass. 1908), noted
in (1909) 22 HARv. L. REv. 304.S1 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338
'(1921), noted il (1921) 19 MiCH. L. REv. 759; (1921) 21 COL. L. Thm. 487.
52Supra note 42, at 633.
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the stakeholder, who has been sued in a federal court, is sub-
jected to claims by persons other than the plaintiff, which relate
to the same obligation and yet which are not directed against any
property that the stakeholder can put into the custody of the
court. Assume, for example, that the principal action at law has
been brought in the United States District Court in Massachu-
setts against a Massachusetts savings bank by a Rhode Islander,
the administrator of a depositor, who sues for the amount of the
deposit with interest. A Massachusetts woman, the depositor's
landlady, asserts that the depositor gave her the bank book be-
fore his death. The bank files an ancillary bill of interpleader.
Here the federal court cannot acquire custody of any res, in the
sense required for that branch of the ancillary jurisdiction. It is
true that the usual deposit of the money in court, which the
stakeholder proposes to make, is often described as a res in inter-
pleader cases, but the word is then used with a different mean-
ing. The landlady's claim is not directed against that money or
any particular money; it runs against the bank upon the original
debt which, she says, was assigned to her. The bank cannot by
its own act transform that debt into the cash placed in the hands
of the court. The deposit of this "res" in court does not give
the court any jurisdiction in rem to determine the ownership of
the debt53
And yet ancillary interpleader is badly needed. If the federal
court proceeds with the suit against the bank without allowing
it to compel the landlady and the administrator to fight out the
validity of the alleged gift between themselves, the court will be
using its process to do the bank a grave injustice. In the absence
of interpleader, the federal jury may find the bank liable to the
administrator on the ground that there was no gift. Then the
bank will have to defend an additional action brought by the
landlady in the state court, where a different jury may find that
there was a gift and oblige the bank to pay a second time. If
the administrator's action had been pending in a Massachusetts
state court, interpleader would clearly have been granted in a
state equity suit, but the federal nature of is action makes it
difficult for a state court to enjoin it " and thus protect the bank
effectively by interpleader. Therefore, since interpleader cannot
be brought in a state court where no regard is paid to diversity
of citizenship, it is but common justice to furnish the bank with
an equally adequate remedy (without regard to diversity of citi-
zenship) in the United States court where the administrator has
53N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, supra note 4; Chafee, Intcrstate
Interpleader, supra note 1, at 714, 715, and cases cited.
54Schuyler v. Pelissier, 3 Edw. Ch. 191 (N. Y. 1838); Smith v. Reed, 74
N. J. Eq. 776, 70 Atl. 961 (1908). See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 20
U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 (1922).
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sued. Otherwise the federal system of duplicate courts fails to
justify its existence. Since this needed federal interpleader prob-
ably cannot be given upon an original bill, because of the nature
of the court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the harassed
bank can obtain its equal and adequate remedy only by the exer-
cise of the equitable powers of the United States court under its
ancillary jurisdiction, "arising out of the inherent power of every
court of justice to control its own process, so as to prevent and
redress wrong." 5
Unfortunately, the judicial opinions in most federal inter-
pleader cases assume the federal jurisdiction without discussing
its basis. Sometimes the report of the case does not make it clear
whether or not partial co-citizenship existed; one would have to
go to the record. In many cases where it clearly did exist, no
explanation is offered to show why it did not oust the court of
jurisdiction. It is convenient to group together all the cases in
which interpleader was maintained by a defendant who had al-
ready been sued in the United States courts 60 either at law or
in equity, but it is not absolutely certain that the court in grant-
ing interpleader considered that it was acting under its ancillary
jurisdiction. In some of these cases it is possible that the court
regarded the interpleader bill as an original bill in the federal
sense, but refrained from throwing it out on account of partial
co-citizenship, either because this point was overlooked or be-
cause the court, in accordance with the line of reasoning already
suggested, did not consider complete diversity of citizenship
essential for even original bills of interpleader. Some additional
significance attaches to the fact, that there are no cases where a
defendant in a federal court sought interpleader and was refused
it because of co-citizenship. The few decisions denying inter-
pleader to a defendant rest on other grounds."7
55 Matthews, J., in Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 282, 4 Sup, Ct.
27, 29 (1884). Although this case involved the custody of a res, the samo
argument applies in its absence to interpleader. See the discussion of
interpleader in this case at 287.
56An asterisk marks cases which were probably regarded as original
bills, either because they were decided before the ancillary jurisdiction was
well established or because of indications in the court's reasoning; these
'are discussed previously in connection with original bills. All the cases
are in chronological order.
1. Defendant in federal action at law based on diversity of citizenship
obtained interpleader or similar relief: *Spring v. South Carolina Insurance
Co., 8 Wheat. 268 (C. C. S. C. 1823); *City Bank v. Skelton, 2 Blatch. 14, 26
(D. N. Y. 1846); Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593 (D. Mass. 1878); Union In-
surance Co. v. Glover, 9 Fed. 529 (C. C. Me. 1881) ; Louisiana State Lottery
Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed. 20 (C. C. La. 1883); *McWhirter v. Halsted, 24 Fed.
828 (C. C. N. J. 1885); Wells, Fargo and Co. v. Miner, 25 Fed. 533 (C. C.
Cal. 1885); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 4 Sup. Ct. 27 (1884)
semble; Lockett v, Rumbough, 40 Fed. 523 (D. N. C. 1889); Groves v. Sen-
tell, 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898 (1894); Buck v. Mason, 135 Fed. 304
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Among the interpleader cases which probably fall under the
ancillary jurisdiction and which cannot easily be explained as
involving the custody of a res, the following merit some atten-
tion: 58
Stne v. B-Ishop r, was the earliest case of interpleader clearly
ancillary. A New Hampshire citizen sued a Massachusetts sav-
ings bank in the federal court, claiming a deposit as held in trust
for him. The bank obtained interpleader against this plaintiff
and the depositor's administrator, a Massachusetts citizen. Judge
Clifford said:
"Jurisdiction of the suit will be assumed, though one of the re-
spondents is a citizen of the same State with the complainant, it
appearing that the suit is auxiliary to the original suit previously
commenced and still pending between citizens of different
States." 0
The next three cases did not say that the julrisdiction was ancil-
lary, and the citizenship of the parties was incompletely stated
in the reports.
C. C. A. 5th, 1905) ; Caten v. Eagle Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 177 Fed. 996 (D. Pa.
1909) ; Huxley v. Pennsylvania Warehousing Co., 184 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 3d,
1911) ; Federal Cement Co. v. Shaffer, 235 Fed. 912 (D. Pa. 1916) ; Sherman
National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917)
af'g 238 Fed. 225; Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 253 Fed. 473 (D. Pa.
1918); Brown v. Home Life Insurance Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (D. Okla. 1925);
Duell v. Greiner, 15 F. (2d) 726 (D. Fla. 1926); Kentucky Distilleries &
W. Co. v. Louisville Public Warehouse Co., 19 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 6th,
1927); Frankfort Distillery Co. v. Dougherty Warehouse Co., 31 F. (2d)
217 (D. Pa. 1928), semble; Fleming v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 40 F. (2d)
38 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 69, 51 Sup. Ct. 76. See Marine
Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., infra note 81.
2. Defendant in federal equity suit based on diversity of citizenship
obtained interpleader or similar relief: Aetna National Bank v. U. S. Life
Insurance Co., 25 Fed. 531 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1885); Mundy .,. Louisville &
Nashville Rr., 67 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895); Federal Mining Co. v.
Bunker Hill Mining Co., 187 Fed. 474 (C. C. Idaho 1909); Hirschmann v.
Bank of Dassel, 21 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
W Interpleader was denied to defendant at law or in equity for other
reasons than co-citizenship: *Herndon v. Ridgway, 17 How. 424 (D. Miss.
1854) (probably defendant in equity); Bartlett v. The Sultan, 23 Fed. 257
(C. C. N. Y. 1885); Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250
Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), rev'g 244 Fed. 195; Breitung v. Packard, 260
Fed. 895 (D. Mass. 1919); Bank of Taiwan v. Gorgas-Pierie Mfg. Co., 273
Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) (defendant in equity); Mallory S. S. Co. v.
Thalhein, 277 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
-5 Of the other unstarred eases in note 56, those which probably involved
a res are mentioned in note 47; three decisions applying the Pennsylvania
statute to allow federal interpleader at law will be discussed later under
section III; and ancillary proceedings of a triangular nature resembling
interpleader, although not precisely taking the form of that remedy, were
allowed in four cases: Brown v. Home Life Insurance Co.; Duell v. Greiner;
Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Louisville Public Warehouse
Co.; Federal Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In Union Insurance Co. v. Glover, ° a Massachusetts policy-
holder sued an insurance company, of unstated citizenship, in the
federal court. A Maine citizen brought a state suit as partial
assignee of the policy. The company interpleaded and the partial
assignee recovered on the ground of an equitable lien. In Louisi-
ana State Lottery Co. v. Clark,0' two suits were brought against
the lottery company in the state court. One plaintiff claimed the
ownership of half of a prize lottery ticket. The other plaintiff
claimed the whole ticket and joined the other claimant in his
suit. The company removed both suits to the federal court, and
then filed a bill of interpleader, which was allowed. In Wells,
Fargo and Co. v. Miner,2 C-1 sold a mining claim to C-2, a Ne-
vada corporation, and received a check for $10,000, which he de-
posited in a banking house in return for $2500 in cash and a
$7500 certificate of deposit, which he indorsed to C-3. The Nevada
corporation, alleging fraud in the sale and C-3'S bad faith, claimed
the certificate, warned the banking house not to pay it, and
brought two state actions against the banking house, one of which
went to judgment. Then C-3 sued the banking house in the United
States court for its refusal to pay the certificate on presenta-
tion. The banking house thereupon filed a federal bill in equity
to interplead the three claimants, and obtained a preliminary
injunction of the actions against it. The citizenship of C-1, C-3,
and the banking house was not stated. If the bank's debt was
the subject matter of controversy, there was no res within the
custody of the court under the doctrine of the Dunlevy case; 03
and nothing was said to show that the certificate of deposit was
regarded as such a res.
Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co. 4 is the most
important of all the federal interpleader cases because of its
extended discussion of the ancillary jurisdiction over inter-
pleader. L, the owner of the American dramatic rights of Maeter-
linck's play, "The Bluebird," made a contract with the Shubert
Theatrical Company, a New York corporation, for the produc-
tion of the play and the sharing of profits. These profits were to
be deposited in a special account in a New York bank, on which
checks could be drawn by either of the two Shubert brothers (ap-
parently the sole stockholders of the New York Shubert corpora-
tion). As security for loans, L assigned to this New York bank
and a Vermont bank half of his share of the profits under the
Shubert contract. Subsequently L became bankrupt. Shortly
59 4 Cliff. 597 (D. Mass. 1878).
60 9 Fed. 529 (C. C. Me. 1881).
61 16 Fed. 20 (C. C. La. 1883).
62 25 Fed. 533 (C. C. Cal. 1885).
, Supra note 4.
64247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), affg 238 Fed. 225.
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afterwards D of New York, L's trustee in bankruptcy, served on
the New York bank an order of the United States district court
in New York, restraining all persons from paying over any funds
in which L claimed an interest, and D demanded that the bank
hold such sums in its possession. Consequently the bank dis-
honored a check drawn by one of the Shuberts for the balance
of the account. The bank was then sued at law in the same fed-
eral court by the Shubert Theatrical Corporation of New Jersey
(probably owned by the Shubert brothers, although the opinions
do not show just how it was interested in the deposit). As an-
cillary to this action at law, the defendant New York bank filed
a bill in the nature of interpleader against both the Shubert cor-
porations, the two Shuberts individually, L, his trustee in bank-
ruptcy, D, and the Vermont bank.05 Although the citizensldp of
the two Shuberts and L is not stated, there was obviously co-citi-
zenship between the New York bank, the New York Shubert cor-
poration, and the trustee in bankruptcy. A strict bill of inter-
pleader would probably have been prevented by the stakeholder's
claim of a lien upon the deposit to secure L's indebtedness, but
the necessary independent equitable ground for a bill in the
nature of interpleader was found in the multiplicity of transac-
tions and in the prayer for an accounting of the profits of "The
Bluebird," which L had unsuccessfully sought to obtain from the
New York Shubert corporation before the bankruptcy.
Judge Learned Hand, in taking jurisdiction, expressly recog-
nizes that the co-citizenship of the New York bank and the trus-
tee in bankruptcy raises the question of the constitutional
jurisdiction of the United States court. Although the bill from
the standpoint of equity pleading is an original bill, that does
not determine its jurisdictional status, which may none the less
be ancillary. It is true, he says, that most cases of ancillary
jurisdiction arise when some property has come into the custody
of the court, or at least when some suit is pending in which the
court may assume possession at any time. But such a possessory
element 6 is not essential. The power of the court to determine
65 Only the New Jersey Shubert corporation and the Vermont bank ap-
pear to have answered the bill. The record is defective, according to the
court, in failing to show the citizenship of the defendants not answering,
whether they were served with process, and whether or not they were
beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
66 Judge Hand tentatively suggests a possessory element here on the
theory that the personal jurisdiction of the federal court in the banlamptcy
proceeding over the bankrupt, L, puts all of L's "property" into court, in-
cluding the bank deposit, and hence under Judicial Code, Section 57, the
court may remove a cloud on L's title to this deposit asserted by a non-
resident claimant. But since the whole dispute is whether the deposit is L's
property, or how far, the bankrupt's mere claim to the deposit hardly
makes it a res in court, especially if personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained
over other claimants. See Chafee, Interstate IRtcrpleader, supra note 1, at
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the ownership of the deposit is necessary in order to avoid the
injustice which would arise from a partial consideration of the
"controversy" in the pending action at law between citizens of
different states.
"The 'controversy' at least involves, not only the liability of the
obligor, but whether the plaintiff is the obligee. The plaintiff,
by asserting that he is the obligee, has necessarily invited a
decision which must determine the identity of the obligee, at least
negatively, and the complete determination of that question is
all that the bill of interpleader seeks to secure, because the court
will in the action decide something positive about the identity
of the obligee, even were it to decide that among all possible
obligees the plaintiff is not one, though it may fail to decide which
is the actual, among all putative obligees. In a question of consti-
tutional jurisdiction it should accept the complete determination
of that question, as the whole of the 'controversy' at stake in the
action; it should not cut too fine .... The power to compel the
obligor to pay must include the power to protect him in his pay-
ment and the successful obligee in his proceeds. It is exactly
analogous to the incidental powers of a court which has custody
of a res. Having awarded possession, the court must have power
toprotect both him who has delivered and him who has received.
In each case the effective exercise of the power itself involves as
an incident its validity against others. In the case of constitu-
tional jurisdiction over choses in action, the same principle ap-
plies as to the territorial jurisdiction over the person in cases of
choses in action, and to the constitutional jurisdiction in posses-
sory suits. ,The court cannot completely protect the results of its
judgment at law in a case such as this, without recourse to that
procedural entirety that courts have devised to that end." 01
Judge Hand relied upon Stone v. Bishop,(" which recognized the
ancillary jurisdiction divorced from any possessory element. Al-
though this decision involved a strict bill of interpleader, the
same principle of constitutional jurisdiction would extend to the
bill in the nature of interpleader in the Shubert case. Conse-
quently, he upheld federal jurisdiction, struck out the defenses
of the New Jersey Shubert corporation, and enjoined state and
federal suits against the stakeholder.
On appeal by the New Jersey Shubert corporation, Judge
Hand's order was affirmed. Judge Ward's opinion expressly says
that it is unnecessary to hold the account a res within the juris-
707, 724. On his interpretation of the Dunlevy case and the foreign garnish-
ment caes, see id. at 711. Judge Hand's interpretation of Blackstono v.
Miller, is affected by the later tax cases cited supra note 6.
67 238 Fed. 228, 229 (1916).
08 Supra note 59. He says this is the only case to that effect. The three
cases in .notes 60, 61 and 62 seem in point though there is no discussion of
ancillary jurisdiction in the opinions.
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diction in order to support the ancillary jurisdiction of inter-
pleader. He appears to go squarely on the alternative ground
that interpleader is necessary to accomplish -justice in the main
action at law. When the account was opened, he points out, the
bank was told that the deposit was under an agreement between
named parties who had an interest in it. The ownership of the
account, both wholly and in part, is claimed by several different
persons. If the action at law stopped here, it is plain that the
New York bank would be exposed to the danger of paying all or
part of the balance to four different persons: the two Shubert
companies, the trustee in bankruptcy, and the Vermont bank.
Nothing but a bill of interpleader in equity could protect the
New Yoik bank from this danger.
"We are clearly of opinion that the bill is ancillary to the action
at law and that the court has complete jurisdiction of the cause
because of the diversity of citizenship in the action at law. As a
pleading its allegations would constitute an original bill, and this
court would have no jurisdiction of it as such for want of proof
of diversity of citizenship. But it is filed, among other things, to
stay the action at law, and so is connected with and ancillary to
it. The jurisdiction of this court over the action at law by virtue
of the citizenship of the parties extends to the ancillary bill." c3
This decision has not gone wholly unquestioned. A law review
asks: 70
"Can it be said that the determination of whether two strangers
to the original suit are the owners of the claim, even though it
involves the determination of whether the original claimant is the
owner or not, is truly ancillary to the original proceeding? ...
While the result may be desirable, the logic is not conclusive."
On the other hand, the case has been approved by other legal
writers and by the court in another circuit.-' With Stom 'v.
Bishwp and the other cases previously described,-- it seems excel-
lent authority for the position that the ancillary jurisdiction over
interpleader is not limited to cases connected with the possession
of a res.
In Hirschnwnn v. Bank of Dassel73 a Minnesota citizen, the
69 247 Fed. 256, 258 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
7 0 Note (1917) 30 HARV. L. RE%. 521.
71 Note (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 560, 561: "The principal case is sound in
holding that where the equity suit depends on a previous action the court
has jurisdiction of the bill since it is part of the controversy already before
the court." DoBiE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 326. Ross v. International
Life Insurance Co., 24 F. (2d) 345, 346 (C. C. A. 6th, 192S).
72 Supra notes 59-62.
73 21 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). The facts as to citizenship are
taken from the record. Federal jurisdiction was not discussed by the court.
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agent of, an Indiana insurance company, assigned his renewal
commissions to a Minnesota bank which brought a federal equity
suit against the insurance company for an accounting. The de-
fendant was allowed to interplead its general agent in Minnesota
who also claimed the commissions, although he was a co-citizen
of the bank.
In Fleming v. Phoenix Assurance Co.,74 eight insurance com-
panies, including the Phoenix, an English corporation, issued fire
policies to Fleming, an Alabaman, each with a clause for pro-
rating any loss. After a fire, all the companies denied liability
for breach of an iron safe clause. Separate suits against the
eight companies were brought by Fleming in the state courts, of
which five, including the suit against the Phoenix, were removed
to the United States court. Fifteen of Fleming's creditors sued
him in the state courts and garnished each of the companies. The
Phoenix company filed a federal bill in equity, joining Fleming,
his creditors, and the other companies, and prayed for a judg-
ment of non-liability or, in the alternative, that the court deter-
mine the amount due Fleming, the prorata liability of each com-
pany, and the rights of Fleming and his creditors. (Three
companies were incorporated in Pennsylvania, the others in dif-
ferent states outside Alabama. The citizenship of the creditors
was not stated, but they resided outside Alabama. The bill was
said to show the necessary diversity of citizenship.) The other
insurance companies were dismissed on appeal, for lack of suffi-
cient community of interest to support a bill of peace; * but
injunctions were held properly granted against federal and state
suits brought by Fleming and the garnishing creditors against
the Phoenix. The decree here is really the converse of that in
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Insurance Co.,70 where a
federal bill in equity was allowed for the purpose of ascertaining
the liability of many insurance companies to a common policy-
holder under the prorata clause. There were fourteen original
suits pending on the law side of the United States court which
the bill sought to restrain and regulate, so that it was sustained
- 40 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 869. The facts
as to citizenship are taken from the record. The court did not discuss fed-
eral jurisdiction or say that the bill was ancillary, but the briefs took
that position. This was not a strict bill of interpleader because the Phoenix
disputed its liability.
7 The court was probably bound by Scruggs and Echols v. Am. Cent.
Insurance Co., 176 Fed. 224 (C. C. A. 5th, 1910), to dismiss the bill of
peace, but it might perhaps be sustained in another circuit for the sako
of winding up the whole controversy in one proceeding. See Va.-Carolina
Chem. Co. v. Home Insurance Co., infra note 76; Dixie v. American Con-
fectionery Co., 124 Tenn. 247, 136 S. W. 915 (1911); 1 PoMsRoY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 459 n.
70113 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902), aff'g 109 Fed. 681.
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as an ancillary proceeding without regard to citizenship. In that
case the ancillary proceeding apportioned several liabilities to one
plaintiff at law among several defendants; in the Flemzing case it
apportioned one liability of one defendant among several plain-
tiffs.
The ancillary jurisdiction is not limited to situations where
the principal suit is based on diversity of citizenship. It also
applies when that suit is brought into a United States court be-
cause of a federal question. Sometimes the ancillary interpleader
proceeding may involve the same federal question, 7 but this is
not essential, as is demonstrated by the recent case of Irving
Thwt Co. v. Marine Midland Tst Co.
s
The Marine Midland Trust Co. of New York lent money to a
broker for the purchase of stock on a "day loan," which by a
New York statute gave the trust company a lien on the securities
bought. Some of these were delivered by the broker to the trust
company and were still in its possession when the broker became
bankrupt less than four months later. Three suits were then
begun against the Marine Midland Trust Co.: (a) a suit in equity
in the federal court under the Bankruptcy Act" by the trustee
in bankruptcy, the Irving Trust Co., to set aside the alleged
preference and recover all the securities, some of which nobody
else claimed; (b) a suit at law in the federal court by E, a cus-
tomer of the broker, for conversion of part of the securities; (c)
a suit at law in the state court by W, another customer, for con-
version of a different group of securities. In addition, both
customers began reclamation in the bankruptcy proceedings (in
the same federal court) to get their respective securities from
the trustee's portfolio. The Marine Midland Trust Co. moved in
the equity suit, where it was defendant, to make the two cus-
tomers parties to that suit on the analogy of a bill in the nature
of a bill of interpleader. The citizenship of the various parties
was not stated, but obviously there was co-citizenship between
the two trust companies, and perhaps with W.
Judge Woolsey granted the motion provisionally, but in a
modified form under the defendant's prayer for general relief.
The defendant's purpose, he said, was the prevention of two situ-
ations which equity holds in abhorrence: a possible double re-
covery against a party; and multiplicity of suits involving issues
which could be conveniently tried together. Though he approved
the defendant's purpose, the proper procedure had not been
7 7 See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, supra note 16; Heinexnann
v. Heinemann, supra note 19, and other cases cited supra notes 13, 15 and
23.
78 47 F. (2d) 907 (D. N. Y. 1931). For subsequent proceedings see infra
note 81.
79 Sections 60b, 70e, 11 U. S. C. §§ 96(b), 110 (e) (1926).
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adopted for its attainment. New parties should not be joined on
motion. The provisions of the New York Practice Act on that
subject could not affect a federal equity suit.', Furthermore,
Judge Woolsey said that neither a cross-bill nor a counterclaim
could be filed in equity to bring in new parties-a point shortly
to be discussed. Consequently, he found a different procedure
necessary, and considered it proper for the defendant to file two
bills in the nature of bills of interpleader, ancillary to the main
equity suit to set aside the preference. One bill should be against
the plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy and E; the other against the
trustee and W. After proper service of subpoena on the claim-
ants, E and W would be temporarily enjoined from proceeding
with their respective legal actions until the final determination of
the bills in the nature of interpleader. If aught should then re-
main to be tried in the actions at law, the several plaintiffs could
then have their jury trial in respect of such residual issues.
Meanwhile, the trial of the principal equity suit would be stayed
for thirty days to allow the defendant to institute the ancillary
suits. (Obviously these ancillary bills involved much more the
federal question of a preference; they also concerned the rights
of E and W to the securities, a matter of state law.)
The Marine Midland Trust Co. filed its ancillary bills in the
nature of interpleader as suggested and obtained the injunctions.
A motion by W to dismiss the bill against him was denied by
Judge Mack. Then E moved to dismiss the bill against him for
lack of jurisdiction and equitable insufficiency; or in the alterna-
tive to vacate Judge Woolsey's order, to compel a fuller statement
of particulars, to restrain the Marine Midland Trust Co. from
proceeding further in this or any similar suit, and to grant a trial
preference in E's federal lawsuit. Except as to the fullep state-
ment of particulars, this motion was denied by Judge Mack.1
On the jurisdictional question he said: 82
"Federal jurisdiction arises from the character of the suit,
ancillary to two proceedings pending in this court, as to each of
which jurisdiction is undisputed; the action at law brought by
Eybro -against Marine in which the ground of jurisdiction is
diversity of citizenship and the suit by Trustee against Marine to
recover an alleged preference."
The result reached in the Marine Midland Trmust CompanV case is
admirable, but one is struck with the rather roundabout nature of
the procedure which Judge Woolsey felt obliged to adopt. Two
80 See discussion under III A to appear in a subsequent issue of the
Joum7ual.
81 Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385 (D.
N. Y. 1932).
82 Id. at 387.
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ancillary bills in the nature of interpleader seem a complicated
addition. The principal proceeding was already in the federal
court on the equity side. The normal way for a defendant in
equity to obtain affimative relief is by a cross-bill, which under
Federal Equity Rule 30 now takes the form of a counterclaim
incorporated in the answer. Interpleader by cross-bill (or an-
swer) seems the natural procedure for a stakeholder who is
already in an equity court, and it is much simpler than the filing
of one or more ancillary bills. This convenient method of bring-
ing in new parties has long been used under state codes. Why
should it not be equally available in the United States courts?
The objection raised by Judge Woolsey and others is that several
cases in United States courts do not allow a cross-bill to bring in
new parties. But this objection appears to have been removed,
after the decisions on which Judge Woolsey relies,83 by the pro-
vision added to Equity Rule 30 in 1925: 8
"When in the determination of a counterclaim complete relief
cannot be granted without the presence of parties other than
those to the bill, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants if they are subject to its jurisdiction."
This language seems sufficiently broad to include the introduction
of new palties through interpleader. In view of the great con-
venience of such practice it is to be hoped that the amended rule
will be construed so as to permit it.- Then the stakeholder who
has been sued by one claimant in a federal equity suit,o will not
have to go to the trouble of filing an ancillary bill but will merely
interplead any other claimants by a counterclaim in his answer.
Whether the precise procedural method allowed be an ancillary
bill or an answer, the cases make it clear that once a stakeholder
has been sued by one claimant in the United States court he will
have little difficulty in interpleading other claimants to the same
obligation, in spite of any co-citizenship between himself and
one or more claimants or among the claimants themselves. This
ancillary relief has the additional advantage of probably dispens-
ing with personal service of process upon nonresident claimants
83 Judge Woolsey cites United States v. Woods, 223 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 8th,
1915); Looney v. Thorpe, 277 Fed. 367, 370 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921). To the
same effect are Federal Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill, 187 Fed. 474 (C. C. Idaho
1909); Williams v. Mason, 7 F. (2d) 143 (D. Fla. 1925). On the divergent
views in state decisions see Note (1920) 33 HARv L. REV. 730.
s 4 HoPINS, THE NEw FEDERAL EQurrY RuLEs (6th ed. 1929) 200.
85 The only case interpreting the new clause is Hunn v. Lewis, 25 F. (2d)
271 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). This recognizes that the law has been changed,
but holds that the counterclaim in the particular case did not state a cause
of action which would justify the joinder of new parties.
se The possibility of interpleader by answer in federal actions at law
will be discussed later under section III.
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who have become plaintiffs in the pending federal suits. Service
upon their attorneys in such suits will probably be accepted as
sufficient.87 However, this praiseworthy liberality as to ancillary
relief does not suffice to protect the stakeholder in a large number
of situations where he is threatened with suits by claimants resid-
ing in other states. In the first place, he cannot obtain ancillary
relief at all unless a nonresident claimant has already started
suit in a federal court. So long as he merely threatens suit, he
probably cannot be served with process in an original bill of
interpleader. It may very well be that some other claimant will
start in the state court and press his suit to judgment before the
nonresident claimant begins his action in the United States court;
then it will probably be too late for interpleader. Secondly, if two
or more claimants are nonresidents, it will not be sufficient for
effective ancillary 'relief if only one of them starts suit in the
federal court. So long as the other nonresident claimants keep
out of the state, the stakeholder will find it impossible to bind
them by interpleader, and indeed his bill may be dismissed for
want of personal jurisdiction over such absent claimants.$ There
may also be situations where the stakeholder is a corporation
doing business in several states, so that claimants who reside in
different states will be able to start suits against the stakeholder
in two or more different federal courts. Under such circum-
stances the stakeholder probably could not get ancillary relief in
either federal court, for want of personal service over the claim-
ant who is suing in the other federal court. Therefore the only
really satisfactory form of protection against claims by residents
of different states is federal jurisdiction over an original bill of
interpleader filed in the district where any claimant resides, with
power in the federal court of that district to serve process on the
other claimants wherever they reside. This wider relief has al-
ready been made possible to a limited class of stakeholders by
the federal interpleader statutes now to be discussed.
87 Minnesota v. St. Paul Co., quoted supra note 42; Young v. McNeal-
Edwards Co., 283 U. S. 398, 51 Sup. Ct. 538 (1931); Sherman v. Shubert
Theatrical Co., supra note 64. See also Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 244 Fed. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
88 Herndon v. Ridgway, supra note 33. See also the statements as to




B. Jurisdiction under tMe Federal interplcader Act of 1917
and Subsequent Legislation "
The provisions of the federal interpleader act of 1917 " may be
summarized as follows: 1. United States district courts have
original jurisdiction over suits in equity begun by bills of inter-
pleader. 2. The stakeholder must be an insurance company or a
fraternal beneficiary society. 3. One or more persons, being bonza
fide 9.1 claimants against the complainant, must reside within the
jurisdiction of the court. 4. The jurisdictional amount involved
in the policy is fixed at $500. 5. "Two or more adverse claimants,
citizens of different States, are claiming or may claim to be en-
titled to such insurance." 6. The amount of such insurance must
be deposited in CoUrt. 2 7. The court shall have power to issue its
process for said claimants, "which shall be addressed to and
served by the United States marshals for the respective districts
wherein said claimants reside or may be found." 7. "The court
shall have power to hear the bill of interpleader and decide
thereon according to the practice in equity." 8. The court shall
have power to discharge the complainant from further liability
upon payment of the insurance as directed by the court, less com-
plainant's "actual court costs." 13 9. The court shall have the
power to make suitable and proper orders and decrees and to
issue "the necessary writs usual and customary in such cases for
the purpose of carrying out such orders and decrees." 10. When
the insurance is payable to a beneficiary, the bill shall be filed in
the district where he resides,-a provision as to venue which
caused a great deal of difficulty of interpretation.1
89 See JOSEPH S. CONWELL, THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT (1920) and
THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT DOWN TO DATE (1920), two valuable
papers read before the Association of Life Insurance Counsel and pub-
lished in pamphlets, from which is taken the information in the following
notes on the history of the bills in Congress. The 1926 pamphlet contains
forms for bill and decrees.
90 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, c. 113, 39 STAT. 929. The bill was introduced in
the House by Representative J. Hampton Moore of Pennsylvania.
91 These two words were inserted by Senator Shields in committee, pre-
sumably to prevent an insurance company from obtaining interpleader
through a pretended claim. On the construction of these words, see Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Mason, 30 F. (2d) 715 (D. N. J. 1929).
92 The bill provided that an offer to deposit the money should be sufficient
to give jurisdiction, but this was changed in committee to require actual
deposit.
93 The bill read "reasonable costs," but this was changed by the House
committee, eliminating the usual allowance of counsel fees to the stake-
holder. See the 1926 Act.
9- The original bill allowed the company a free choice to interplead in the
district wherein any claimant resided. The House committee limited the
choice to the district of either a beneficiary or an assignee. Senator Shields
in committee limited the choice to the beneficiary's district if there was a
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In 1925 a second statute was substituted,05 making some im-
portant changes which were carried over into the existing 1926
law. Through inadvertency several lines were omitted from the
bill during its passage through Congress, and consequently the
statement of the powers of the courts was so drastically cut down
that their ability to give relief might have been impaired. How-
ever, this statute remained in force only a year before the error
was corrected. It was then replaced by the statute of 1926, which
is still in force as section 24 (26) of the Judicial Code. The text
of the present act is as follows: 00
"That the district courts of the United States shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction to entertain and determine suits in equity begun
by bills of interpleader duly verified, filed by any casualty com-
pany, surety company, insurance company or association or fra-
ternal or beneficial society, and averring that one or more per-
sons who are bona fide claimants against such company, associa-
tion, or society resides or reside within the territorial jurisdiction
of said court; that such company, association, or society has in
its custody or possession money or property of the value of $500
or more, or has issued a bond or a policy of insurance or cer-
tificate of membership providing for the payment of $500 or
more to the obligee or obligees in such bond or as insurance,
indemnity, or benefits to a beneficiary, beneficiaries, or the heirs,
next of kin, legal representatives, or assignee of the person in-
sured or member; that two or more adverse claimants, citizens
of different States, are claiming to be entitled to such money .or
property or the penalty of such bond, or to such insurance, in-
demnity, or benefits; that such company, association, or society
has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount of
such bond or policy into the registry of the court, there to abide
the judgment of the court.
Sec. 2. In all such cases if the policy or certificate is drawn
payable to the estate of the insured and has not been assigned in
beneficiary. The following cases interpret the venue provisions of the
various acts: Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Henderson, 244 Fed.
877 (D. Fla. 1917); N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 263 Fed.
287 (D. Fla. 1918); Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F.
(2d) 107 (D. Tex. 1928); Bankers' Life Insurance Co. v. Ebbert, 48 F.
(2d) 907 (D. Pa. 1928). The courts have tended to put an assignee on the
same footing with a beneficiary, so that in a controversy between them
interpleader may be brought in the district where either resides. Conwell's
two pamphlets fully discuss the operation of the various venue clauses.
95Act of Feb. 25, 1925, c. 317, 43 STAT. 976, 28 U. S. C. § 41(26) (1926).
This was ifitroduced in the Senate by Senator George W. Pepper of Penn-
sylvania.
96Act of May 8, 1926, c, 273, 44 STAT. 416 (1929), 28 V. S. C. supp.
§ 41(26). This was also introduced in the Senate by Senator Pepper,
reported without amendment and sent to the House, where it was amended
to include casualty and surety companies and their contracts. The Senate
concurred in these amendments at the request of the committee of the
Association of Life Insurance Counsel, which had the matter in charge.
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accordance with the terms of the policy or certificate the district
court of the district of the residence of the personal representa-
tive of the insured shall have jurisdiction of such suit. In case
the policy or certificate has been assigned during the life of the
insured in accordance with the terms of the policy or certificate,
the district court of the district of the residence of the assignee
or of his personal representative shall have jurisdiction. In case
the policy or certificate is drawn payable to a beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries and there has been no such assignment as aforesaid the
jurisdiction shall be in the district court of the district in which
the beneficiary or beneficiaries or their personal representatives
reside. In case there are claimants of such money or property,
or in case there are beneficiaries under any such bond or policy
resident in more districts than one, then jurisdiction shall be in
the district court in any district in which a beneficiary or the per-
sonal representative of a claimant or a deceased claimant or
beneficiary resides. Notwithstanding any provision of the Judi-
cial Code to the contrary, said court shall have power to issue its
process for all such claimants and to issue an order of injunction
against each of them, enjoining them from instituting or pros-
ecuting any suit or proceeding in any State court or in any other
Federal court on account of such money or property or on such
bond or on such policy or certificate of membership until the
further order of the court; which process and order of injunction
shall be returnable at such time as the said court or a judge
thereof shall determine and shall be addressed to and served by
the United States marshals for the respective districts wherein
said claimants reside or may be found.
Sec. 3. Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall
discharge the complainant from further liability; and shall make
the injunction permanent and enter all such other orders and
decrees as may be suitable and proper, and issue all such custom-
ary writs as may be necessary or convenient to carry out and
enforce the same.
The principal differences from the 1917 act, some of them intro-
duced in 1925 as indicated, are these: 1. The list of persons en-
titled to interplead is expanded to include insurance associations
(1925), and casualty and surety companies; O and appropriate
references to bonds are consequently inserted at various places
in the statute. 2. To insurance policies and certificates as sub-
ject-matters of controversy are added indemnity (1925) and
money or property in the custody of the stakeholder; this last
item takes care of insurance companies who have retained the
amount of the policy after its maturity under an arrangement
for periodical payments to beneficiaries. 3. The "may claim"
clause was omitted; defendants must now actually claim.03 4.
97For the history of this addition, see supra note 96.
vs This change was made in order to secure the passage of the Act of
1926. Some of the members of the Senate subcommittee were not willing
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The venue clause is expanded (1925) to allow suit to be brought
in an assignee's district or in the district where any beneficiary
resides when there are several beneficiaries. These attempts to
give a preferential venue to particular types of claimants have
caused considerable difficulties of judicial interpretation.,, 5.
Other provisions of the Judicial Code are not to prevent the dis-
trict court from temporarily enjoining any state or federal suit
against the stakeholder relating to the same controversy. 100 6.
Nor are such other provisions to prevent the court from issuing
its process for all the claimants in any federal districts wherein
they reside or may be found.10 1 7. The court shall have power
to make the injunction against the claimants permanent (1925).
8. The provision for the discharge of the stakeholder omits the
clause about deduction of "actual court costs" (1925).12
The foregoing federal interpleader legislation has been re-
markably successful. Out of 25 reported cases under the three
statutes, interpleader was granted in 19 cases,10 3 and equivalent
to permit the companies to obtain the jurisdiction of the District Court
when there was only a possibility of claims by tvo or more persons.
29 Supra note 94.
100 This clause was due to the denial of injunctions in Lowther v. N. Y.
Life Insurance Co., 278 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922). The clause was in-
serted in the 1925 draft, in the portion which was inadvertently omitted
during passage.
101 This provision for service of process in other districts appeared in a
less explicit form in the 1917 act, and was inadvertently omitted altogether
in the 1925 act. This omission caused trouble in two unreported cases men-
tioned by Conwell. The provision was held constitutional in National Firo
Insurance Co. v. Sanders, infra, note 121; see also U. S. v. Congress Con-
struction Co., 22 U. S. 199, 203 (1911).
102 See supra note 93.
103N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 253 Fed. 287 (D. Fla. 1918);
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Reid, 263 Fed. 451 (D. Md.
1920) rev'd on another point, Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 4th,
1921); Lowther v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 27& Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922); Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Rosenbaum, 280 Fed. 861 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922); Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Cummings, 4 F. (2d) 794 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1925); N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F. (2d) 126 (D.
Idaho 1926), 17 F. (2d) 112; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Reid, 16 F. (2d)
502 (D. Pa. 1926); Terry v. Supreme Forest, 21 F. (2d) 158 (D. Tenn.
1926); Ackermanv. Tobin, 22 P. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Kansas
City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 107, 712 (D. Tex. 1928);
Ross v. International Life Insurance Co., 24 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 6th,
1928); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 630, 49 Sup. Ct. 30; Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Mason, 30 F. (2d) 715 (D. N. T. 1929); National Fire Insurance
Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), rev'g 33 F. (2d) 157;
Allen v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Peyraud v. Gray, 47
F. (2d) 1063 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Bankers' Life Co. v. Ebbert, 48 F. (2d)
907 (D. Pa. 1928); Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown, 52 F.
(2d) 164 (D. La. 1931); Vogel v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 55 F. (2d) 205
(C. C. A. 5th,,1932).
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relief was given in one more case.'" In one case the final outcome
remained doubtful.O Interpleader was denied in only four re-
ported cases, 16 and in only one of these was the cause of failure
absence of federal jurisdiction. This case held that a claimant
who was a citizen of the District of Columbia could not be inter-
pleaded under the statute.-
Two interesting jurisdictional questions are presented by this
federal legislation: (1) What is the effect of co-citizenship be-
tween the applicant and one or more claimants? (2) What is
the effect of co-citizenship among two or more claimants? 11
Co-citizenship Between the Applicant and One or More Claimants
Earlier in this article the view was expressed 0 that such co-
citizenship is perhaps a bar to federal interpleader in the absence
104 Royal Neighbors v. Lowary, 46 F. (2d) 565 (D. Mont. 1931). Al-
though Judge Bourquin said that he was denying interpleader, this ap-
parently meant nothing more than the refusal of counsel fees to the
stakeholder, because the court went ahead and decided the controversy
between the two claimants.
105 Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Yaw, 53 F. (2d) 684 (D.
N. Y. 1931). An injunction was denied because there was a dispute as to
the amount of the stakeholder's liability; but the bill was not dismissed.
Two unreported inconclusive cases under the 1925 act are discussed in Con-
well's 1926 pamphlet, cited svpr, note 89, at 470, 471, 480, 487.
' o6Penn. Mutual v. Henderson, 244 Fed. 877 (D. Fla. 1917); Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365 (D. Cal. 1921); Calloway
v. Miles, 30 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929), questioned in National Fire
Insurance Co. v. Sanders, supra, note 103; Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Lusk, 46 F. (2d) 505 (D. La. 1930).
107 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, supra note 106. The claimants were
a wife, the original beneficiary, who lived in California, and four children,
the substituted beneficiaries, three of whom lived in New York and one in
the District of Columbia. Interpleader was begun in the United States
district court in California. The bill was dismissed on motion by the
children. Judge Bledsoe said that the District of Columbia was not a state
within the Constitution or the statute. He refused to entertain the suit as
a contest between the wife and the New York children with respect to three-
quarters of the fund, because he regarded the District of Columbia claimant
as an indispensable party.
208 Complete diversity of citizenship apparently existed in the following
cases under the statute cited supra note 103: New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Kennedy; Reid v. Durboraw; Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Cum-
mings; Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson; Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Mason; National Life Insurance Co. v. Sanders; Peyraud v. Gray
(shown by record); Vogel v. Life Insurance Co.; Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co. v. Yaw, supra note 105; in the following cases in note 106:
Penn Mutual v. Henderson; Calloway v. Miles.
Partial co-citizenship possibly existed in some of the following cases
where the reports do not give sufficiently specific information: Guardian
Life Insurance Co. v. Rosenbaum; Bankers' Life Co. v. Ebber both cLpra
note 103; Royal Neighbors v. Lowary, supra note 104.
10 Supra under IA, in subsection headed Original Bills of Iterpkcadcr
Based on Diversity of Citizenship.
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of a statute. However, the problem may be different under the
particular legislation before us, especially when the stakeholder
is not a citizen of the state where he interpleads. None of the
three federal interpleader actions makes any requirement about
the citizenship of the stakeholder. The only requisite as to fed-
eral jurisdiction which is expressed is that "two or more adverse
claimants, citizens of different States," are claiming the subject-
matter of controversy. If the requirement of complete diversity
of citizenship among adverse parties is imposed by the Constitu-
tion, then the gap in the statutory requisites is immaterial. If
the Constitution makes the co-citizenship of the stakeholder and
a claimant a bar to interpleader, this bar cannot be removed by
Congress. However, it is arguable that the language of the Con-
stitution, "Controversies, . . . between Citizens of different
States" is satisfied if one person on each side of the controversy
comes from a different state from one person on the opposite
side. According to this view, the decisions of the Supreme Court
requiring complete diversity of citizenship are merely construc-
tion of the Congressional legislation with respect to the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts. This view is supported by the
fact that the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbidge v.
Curtiss 110 does not mention the Constitution but rests entirely on
the words of the act of Congress: "Where ... the suit is between
a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another state." The objection may be raised that this statutory
language is virtually the same as that of the Constitution, so that
if complete diversity of citizenship is held to be the meaning of
the words of the statute, it must also be the meaning of the
similar words of the Constitution. But this does not necessarily
follow. The Constitution need not be construed as strictly as a
statute."1 " If a court finds that Congress has not authorized a
particular governmental action, Congress can easily amend the
statute so as to confer the power; but if such action is held to
be outside the scope of the Constitution, the defect is very difficult
to cure. The Constitution is the outline of a scheme of national
government, and Congress and the courts must not be cramped
in filling in the details of this outline as needs alter. For ex-
ample, Mr. Justice Holmes in the two Stock Dividend cases "I
considered that "income" in a tax law did not include stock divi-
dends unless Congress expressly said so; but that "income" in
the Sixteenth Amendment could be interpreted to let Congress
tax such dividehds by amending the law.
"It is not necessarily true that income means the same thing in
the: Constitution and the Act. A word is not a crystal, transpar-
ent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may
110 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806),
111 CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922) 83 ff.
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vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used." 113
The practical reasons are plain for a limited construction of the
general statute on the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the
federal courts. If complete diversity were not required, many
more cases would be taken away from state tribunals, arousing
more jealousy in the states and increasing the burdens of the
federal judges. Therefore, it is reasonable for those courts to
reject cases of partial citizenship when Congress has not defi-
nitely indicated an intention to deal with them. If this narrow
construction of the statute were unsatisfactory to Congress, it
could amend the law so as to indicate its intention definitely. But
by enacting the interpleader statutes Congress did exhibit a clear
intention to throw a new type of litigation into the federal courts
and remedy an evil which was made obvious by the Dznlevy
case.'- This evil is just as great when the stakeholder is a co-
citizen of one claimant as when he is not. There is little question
of taking these cases away from the state courts,-most of them
cannot be decided there at all because of the impossibility of
service of process on claimants residing in different states. The
interpleader statutes do not expressly make this partial co-citi-
zenship a bar, and neither does the Constitution. Consequently,
the purpose of the statutes will best be served if this partial co-
citizenship be ignored. And if the statutes are not yet sufficiently
explicit on the jurisdictional requisites to permit this constric-
tion, it would seem both desirable and constitutional for Congress
to amend the law so as to widen the federal interpleader jurisdic-
tion sufficiently to take care of this situation.11s
No authoritative conclusion on this question can be reached
in the absence of any Supreme Court decisions construing the
interpleader statutes. One Circuit Court of Appeals has twice
granted interpleader where the stakeholder was a co-citizen of
some claimants, but not of the particular claimant in whose dis-
112 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158 (1918); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 197 (1920), dissenting
opinion.
113 Towne v. Eisner, supra note 112, at 425.
14 Supra note 4.
1:15 Support for this reasoning is found in the construction of the Removal
Act of 1875 in Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205 (1880). The previous
Removal Act of 1866 allowed the removal of that part of a state suit which
constituted a separable controversy between citizens wholly of different
states. The Act of 1875 was held to allow removal by any defendant affected
with prejudice so as to carry the entire litigation to the United States
court, irrespective of the residence of the plaintiffs and other defendants.
Thus co-citizens might be brought into the federal court. Cf. Cochran v.
Montgomery County, 199 U. S. 260, 26 Sup. Ct. 58 (1905).
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trict interpleader was brought.11 There is a dictum on the point
by Judge Bledsoe in an opinion which gives careful consideration
to the jurisdictional problems raised by this legislation: "I
"The controversy here is not between the insurance company and
the claimants. If so, the court obviously would be without juris-
diction because some of the claimants are citizens of New York,
of the same state of which the plaintiff itself is a citizen. Disre-
garding the formal and looking to the substantial alignment of
the parties ... the real and seemingly only controversy in the
case is between the claimants."
Must There Be Complete Diversity of Citizenship Among the
Claimants?
Here the statutes are more explicit, because they say "two or
more adverse claimants, citizens of different States." If there
are only two claimants, it is certain that their co-citizenship
would be a bar to relief. Suppose, however, that there are three
claimants. Is it sufficient that tvo of them belong in one state
and the third in another? This seems enough in cases where the
co-citizens have exactly the same interest, for instance, when
insurance money is claimed by the widow living in one state
and two children of a former wife, living in another state; here
each child claims only half of the insurance money and recog-
nizes the claim of the other child. Under such circumstances the
non-antagonistic co-citizen claimants may be considered aligned
together on one side of the controversy in the second stage in
opposition to the claimant who lives in another state. This posi-
tion is supported by the cases.118 The real problem arises when
the co-citizen claimants are antagonistic to each other. For ex-
110 Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d). 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). A Now
York casualty company issued a robbery policy to a citizen of Missouri,
who sued in the state court. The action was removed to the federal court.
Several New York creditors of the policyholder garnished the company in
New York state suits. The company interpleaded the policyholder and the
creditors in the Missouri federal court, which determined the priorities of
the creditors. The effect of the co-citizenship was not discussed.
Allen v. ,Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). A New York
life insurance company issued policies on the life of C-1 of New York
payable to his firm. C-1 sold out to his partner, C-2 of Arkansas, who at
once demanded the surrender value of the policy from the company. C-i
demanded a fraction of the surrender value proportional to his interest In
the firm. The company interpleaded both partners in the Arkansas federal
court. The effect of the co-citizenship was not discussed. (The facts as to
citizenship are in the record but not in the report.)
1 " Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365, 372 (D. Col. 1921).
11s Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, supra note 117, semble; Now York
-Life Insurance Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F. (2d) 126, 17 F. (2d) 112 (D. Idaho
1926); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 630.
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ample, life insurance money is claimed by each of three succes-
sive assignees, two of whom live in the same state. Here it seems
a strained construction of the statute to make the phrase "citi-
zens of several States" limit only the word "two" and not the
whole of the preceding phrase so as to mean that the claimants,
however many they be, must each reside in a different state. The
second stage of the interpleader is surely a real controversy.
Yet, it is significant of the ease with which interpleader has been
granted under the federal legislation that partial co-citizenship
among the claimants has never been held a bar to relief. Judge
Bledsoe left the question open in the case just quoted,"" and five
decisions granted interpleader where some antagonistic claim-
ants were apparently co-citizens.12, However, the point was not
discussed, and may have been overlooked by court and parties.
Thus the effect of partial co-citizenship among the claimants is
still unsettled, but when it is squarely raised it will probably bar
relief unless ancillary jurisdiction can be established.
An entirely different jurisdictional problem was raised by Na-
tionctl Fire Insurance Co. v. Smiers,"' which involved the power
of a federal court to allow interpleader for a debt already gar-
nished in a state court. After a fire loss had been adjusted, an
Illinois creditor sued the Texan policyholder in the Illinois state
court, serving him by publication, and garnished the Connecticut
insurance company. Judgment was rendered against the Texan
and the garnishment (or attachment, as the court called it' -- )
was sustained. The Texan notified the company that the insur-
ance money from his homestead was exempt from seizure under
Texas law, so that he would endeavor to hold the company even
though the creditor won the Illinois suit. The company inter-
pleaded the policyholder and the creditor in the Texas federal
court. The policyholder's wife intervened, claiming exemption
for the homestead as community property. The creditor moved
119 Mlutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lott, supra note 117.
- 0 Lowther v. New York Life Insurance Co., 278 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922) (two successive assignees, apparently of Illinois); Fid. & D. Co. v.
Reid, 16 F. (2d) 502 (D. Pa. 1926) (conflicting claims by subcontractors,
several of them in Pennsylvania); Ackerman v. Tobin, supra note 116;
Ross v. Inter. Life Insurance Co., 24 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928)
(possibly ancillary to a federal cancellation suit); Globe & Rutgers Fire
Insurance Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 164 (D. La. 1931) (trustee in bank.
ruptecy and mortgagee bank both in Louisiana). Relief was denied for other
reasons in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lusk, 46 F. (2d) 505 (D.
La. 1930) (several Alabama garnishing creditors).
121-38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), rev'g 33 F. (2d) 157. See Note
(1931) 9 TEx L. REv. 281. See also Ackerman v. Tobin, supra note 116.
-2 The question whether this was a garnishment or an attachment is
discussed in a Note in (1931) 26 ILL. L. REN,. 77, which concludes that it
was a garnishment.
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to dismiss the bill on the grounds that judgment in the Illinois
court where the fund was impounded gave that court sole con-
trol of the res; and that the company was in no danger of paying
the loss twice, because satisfaction of the Illinois judgment would
be a good defence to any claim made by the policyholder in an-
other suit.
In granting the motion, the district court said: 123
"The statute invoked here clearly does not enlarge the functions
or application of the equitable principles of interpleader. It en-
larges the jurisdiction of this court as to parties when a certain
* state of facts is shown to exist, but it does not make appropriate
the use or remedy afforded by a bill of interpleader to cases
where such remedy, before the statute, would not apply."
In reversing the decision, Judge Foster replied to this argument
by saying: 12
"It may be conceded that the statute does not enlarge the equit-
able right of interpleader, but neither does it restrict it. It is
not necessary to seek any enlargement of equitable right from
the statute in this case. It is a fundamental principle of inter-
pleader that its office is not so much to protect a party against
double liability as against double vexation in respect of one lia-
bility. It is immaterial whether the danger apprehended comes
from suits pending or merely threatened. In either case, a court
of equity having jurisdiction over the parties may enjoin the
institution or further prosecution of the suits and grant adequate
relief to the stakeholder and the adverse claimants of the fund."
Whether money had been impounded by the Illinois court was
immaterial, since,the Texas federal court had a fund in its own
hands to award to either claimant. The garnishment proceed-
ings, he said, did not vest jurisdiction of the res in the Illinois
court. What was attached was a credit. The Illinois suit was in
personam, though quasi in rem to the extent that the judgment
could be satisfied only out of the property attached. The court
below wrongly said that the claims are not adverse. Each claim-
ant seeks the proceeds of the policy to the exclusion of the other.
The creditor claims by virtue of the Illinois judgment and at-
tachment; the policyholder, although not disputing his obligation
to the creditor, claims the proceeds as exempt: 125
"The statute is remedial and to be liberally construed. It is broad
enough to cover any adverse claims against the proceeds of the
policies, no matter on what grounds urged. Its terms are not to
be interpreted as meaning only adverse claims of those pretend-
ing to be beneficiaries of the insured."
12333 F. (2d) at 158.
124 38 F. (2d) at 214.
I2 Ibid.
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The foreign garnishment cases in the United States Supreme"
Court do not render the company's remedy'at law adequate.1 20
Although the Illinois courts do not recognize the Texas exemp-
tion, quite possibly the Texas state courts would give effect to it
and decide for the policyholder against the company, disregard-
ing the Illinois judgment. Even if the company could in a pro-
longed contest of the Texas litigation finally establish the binding
effect of the Illinois judgment, the expense would probably exceed
the insurance money involved. Equitable jurisdiction will be
sustained when time, expense, and multiplicity of suits will be
saved. The burdens of such double litigation are amply illus-
trated by the foreign garnishment cases, which had to be carried
all the way to the United States Supreme Court in order to
secure the protection of the full faith and credit clause:
"No doubt it was to prevent this very species of injustice that
Congress adopted the act of 1917, recognizing that insurance
companies doing an interstate business are more apt to be sub-
jected to this kind of vexation than any other litigant."
In this case, neither claimant can lose anything by the filing of
the bill. If the creditor has a garnishment lien, he can follow it
into the registry of the Texas federal court; and the policyholder
will get the deposit if his exemption is superior.
This is the most important decision thus far upon the scope of
the federal interpleader legislation. It sustains the provision
allowing process to run in any district, and it expressly advo-
cates a liberal construction of the present statute.
To be continued
320 Examples are: Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19
Sup. Ct. 797 (1899) ; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1905).
On the relation of these cases to interpleader see Chafee, Intcustato Inter-
pleader, supra note 1, at 708. It was held in Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191,
46 N. E. 180 (1897), that when the ownership of a garnishment debt was
disputed, the adjudication of its ownership by the court of garnishment did
not bind the absent claimant to the debt.
12 Supra note 124, at 215.
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